Forecasting IT Security Vulnerabilities - An Empirical Analysis by Yasasin, Emrah et al.
Forecasting IT Security Vulnerabilities -
An Empirical Analysis
Emrah Yasasina∗, Julian Presterb, Gerit Wagnera, Guido Schryenc
aDepartment of Management Information Systems, University of Regensburg, Universita¨tsstraße 31, 93053
Regensburg, Germany
bSchool of Information Systems, UNSW Business School, Kensington NSW 2052, Australia
cFaculty of Business Administration and Economics, Paderborn University, Warburger Strasse 100, 33098
Paderborn, Germany
Abstract
Today, organizations must deal with a plethora of IT security threats and to ensure smooth and
uninterrupted business operations, firms are challenged to predict the volume of IT security vulner-
abilities and allocate resources for fixing them. This challenge requires decision makers to assess
which system or software packages are prone to vulnerabilities, how many post-release vulnerabili-
ties can be expected to occur during a certain period of time, and what impact exploits might have.
Substantial research has been dedicated to techniques that analyze source code and detect security
vulnerabilities. However, only limited research has focused on forecasting security vulnerabilities
that are detected and reported after the release of software. To address this shortcoming, we ap-
ply established methodologies which are capable of forecasting events exhibiting specific time series
characteristics of security vulnerabilities, i.e., rareness of occurrence, volatility, non-stationarity,
and seasonality. Based on a dataset taken from the National Vulnerability Database (NVD), we use
the Mean Absolute Error (MAE) and Root Mean Square Error (RMSE) to measure the forecasting
accuracy of single, double, and triple exponential smoothing methodologies, Croston’s methodology,
ARIMA, and a neural network-based approach. We analyze the impact of the applied forecasting
methodology on the prediction accuracy with regard to its robustness along the dimensions of the
examined system and software package “operating systems”, “browsers” and “office solutions” and
the applied metrics. To the best of our knowledge, this study is the first to analyze the effect
of forecasting methodologies and to apply metrics that are suitable in this context. Our results
show that the optimal forecasting methodology depends on the software or system package, as some
methodologies perform poorly in the context of IT security vulnerabilities, that absolute metrics
can cover the actual prediction error precisely, and that the prediction accuracy is robust within the
two applied forecasting-error metrics.
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1. Introduction
The impact of information technology (IT) security vulnerabilities can be substantial: In an
industry study, IBM estimates that reputation-related costs resulting from software security vul-
nerabilities which lead to a disruption of business operations range in the millions of dollars per
disruption (IBM Global Study, 2013). The economic consequences of breaches have been exam-5
ined by FireEye, a network security company. Specifically, their data breach cost report for 2016
revealed that 76 % of respondents would take their business away from a vendor that had demon-
strated negligent data handling practices (eWeek, 2016; FireEye, 2016). Similarly, the 2016 Cost of
Data Breach report by the Ponemon Institute and IBM Security showed that the average total cost
of a breach is US$4 million, an increase of 29% since 2013, with disruptions in daily operations being10
the most severe category of impact (Ponemon Institute, 2016). In the aftermath of a breach, firms
are challenged to mitigate the long-term financial impact by restoring customer trust. In essence,
these reports indicate that vulnerabilities pose permanent risks for firms for which they need to be
prepared. These risks are as diverse as they are plentiful, e.g., network attacks (GhasemiGol et al.,
2016), loss or theft of personal data, loss or theft of commercially sensitive information, inopera-15
ble IT systems (making the business unable to function after being hacked), intellectual property
infringement, and extortion, which can lead to serious financial damage (ContractorUK, 2016).
Predictions of the numbers of post-release vulnerabilities are an important input for several
managerial decisions in which avoiding aforementioned damages is a critical objective. Especially,
those that are designed without assuming access to proprietary information, such as code structure20
or software development practices, are needed in a range of situations. First, from the perspective
of organizations developing software, established techniques for predicting and detecting bugs are
complemented by techniques specifically designed for forecasting post-release vulnerabilities (Walden
et al., 2014). In this specific context, vulnerability forecasting methodologies which do not require
analyses of (running) software systems are convenient for developers to avoid degrading service qual-25
ity and to assess vulnerabilities when software systems are not available, e.g., due to maintenance
(Venter and Eloff, 2004). Significant managerial decisions include proactively prioritizing and direct-
ing resources for security inspection, testing, and patching accordingly (Kim et al., 2007; Shin et al.,
2011; Walden et al., 2014; Venter and Eloff, 2004). Predicted numbers of vulnerabilities can also
serve as critical input for strategic decisions on when to release a software product (Kim and Kim,30
2016). Second, from the perspective of organizations managing their software portfolio, numbers of
vulnerabilities expected in external software products inform decisions to acquire, and discontinue
(potentially proprietary) software. In this case, forecasting techniques that do not require access
to the code or other non-public information are the only viable option to forecast vulnerabilities
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of proprietary software whose code is not publicly accessible (Roumani et al., 2015). Such assess-35
ments of vulnerability offer measures of trustworthiness and security of software products (Kim and
Kim, 2016), which are necessary to evaluate the functional characteristics of software products in
software portfolio management decisions, including selection and discontinuance decisions (Franch
and Carvallo, 2003; Zaidan et al., 2015; Kim et al., 2007). Third, organizations developing apps
and extensions must react to vulnerabilities and corresponding security updates of their underlying40
platform software (Tiwana, 2015), such as browsers and operating systems, extending the rele-
vance of anticipating vulnerability occurrence to resource planning and platform-homing decisions
of third-party developers.
Our study focuses on the research challenge of forecasting the number of post-release security
vulnerabilities in subsequent periods of time. Time-series analyses can be expected to provide a45
viable option for vulnerability predictions for two reasons. First, the rolling-release model adopted
by many software projects, such as the Linux kernel (approx. every 2-3 months), results in the
regular release of revised software that can be subjected to scrutiny and attacked by hackers. Sec-
ond, annual hacker meetings (e.g., DEFCON and Pwn2Own) create regular spikes in vulnerability
searches. Although substantial research on pre-release vulnerability detection has been published50
(Walden et al., 2014), our sample does not provide evidence for declining post-release vulnerabilities
detection rates for software products still under active development. This indicates that despite
evolving techniques for pre-release vulnerability detection, the importance of post-release vulnera-
bility forecasting remains intact. To reliably forecast the number of vulnerabilities for a particular
system or software package, we contend that forecasting methodologies must account for four fun-55
damental properties of security vulnerabilities (Gegick et al., 2009; Joh and Malaiya, 2009): First,
vulnerabilities are rare events (Shin et al., 2011); to be specific, it is not uncommon that no vul-
nerabilities are reported throughout several months. Second, with respect to those months where
vulnerabilities are observed, there are a few periods in which a comparatively high numbers of vul-
nerabilities are reported. For instance, 19 vulnerabilities (CVE-2012-1126 to CVE-2012-1144) were60
reported for the Firefox browser in April 2012 (MITRE Corporation, 2017a), while there were none
in May and June, 2014. Third, time series of vulnerabilities are not necessarily stationary, 1 mean-
ing that they do not have the same expected value and variance at each point in time. One reason
for this is the development of software within the version history. While some versions represent
minor changes, others include substantial changes in the software. For example, the completely over-65
hauled Firefox implemented in the new Quantum version represented major changes in performance
and security. These include a stricter and more confined framework for extensions and additional
1“A time series is stationary if its statistical properties (mean, variance and autocorrelation) are held constant
over time” (Ferreiro, 1987, p. 65).
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sandboxing (Mozilla, 2017). In our study, we therefore take different versions of each package into
account and examine them separately. Finally, the discovery of vulnerabilities may follow seasonal
patterns, which is explained by the increasing implementation of time-based software release cycles70
(Joh and Malaiya, 2009), and which are becoming the dominant development model in open-source
and proprietary projects. For instance, the Linux project releases new kernels on a regular basis,
while Microsoft follows a time-based model for releasing updates for Windows.
The academic literature dealt with the study of IT security vulnerabilities using regression tech-
niques for prediction (Shin and Williams, 2008; Chowdhury and Zulkernine, 2011; Shin et al., 2011;75
Zhang et al., 2011; Shin and Williams, 2013; Walden et al., 2014), machine learning techniques
(Neuhaus et al., 2007; Gegick et al., 2009; Nguyen and Tran, 2010; Scandariato et al., 2014), statis-
tical analyses with the help of reliability growth models and vulnerability discovery models (Ozment,
2006; Ozment and Schechter, 2006; Joh, 2011), and time series analysis (Roumani et al., 2015; Last,
2016). While an evaluation of these methodologies shows sound performance values, we observe that80
none of these approaches consider methodologies which account for the unique rareness of occurrence
and high volatility of vulnerabilities. Furthermore, only two recent studies (Roumani et al., 2015;
Last, 2016) focus on vulnerability forecasting from a time series perspective. While Roumani et al.
(2015) implemented ARIMA and exponential smoothing, Last (2016) implemented both regression
models (Linear, Quadratic, and Combined) and machine learning techniques to forecast vulnerabil-85
ities of browsers, operating systems, and video players. Both studies show an acceptable fit and can
be helpful to forecast security vulnerabilities. However, the techniques applied in these studies do
not explicitly address the specific properties of security vulnerabilities. Since prediction accuracy
depends on the characteristics of the forecasting methodology, we implement methodologies that
are particularly suitable for the properties of security vulnerability time-series, such as Croston’s90
methodology (Croston, 1972).
Furthermore, the particular system or software package under consideration needs attention, as
different packages have different release cycles and numbers of vulnerabilities that are not taken into
account when not grouped together. It is necessary to differentiate between different versions due to
changes within the development history. We therefore argue that the prediction accuracy depends95
on the system or software packages. For instance, the number of vulnerabilities is related to the
market share and the maturity stage of the product: for example, Alhazmi et al. (2007) point out
that if a system or software starts to attract attention and users start switching to it, the number
of vulnerabilities will increase. Another example is the degree of maturity. A system or software is
likely to have more vulnerabilities in its early stages rather than a mature one which has been used100
and tested for years.
Finally, the usage of suitable accuracy metrics is also a crucial point when examining the forecast
quality. The academic literature provides a lot of accuracy metrics (cf. the literature reviews on
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accuracy metrics Hyndman and Koehler (2006); Hyndman et al. (2006); Willemain et al. (2004);
Willmott et al. (1985)), but not all are suitable when the time series are zero-inflated. For example,105
prediction accuracy metrics which compute the percentage error of the forecast and actual vulner-
abilities are not adaptable by definition. These metrics produce infinite / undefined values when
there are no actual vulnerabilities reported for time t.
The aforementioned arguments concerning the methodology, object and metrics of vulnerability
prediction result in the research question,110
“How accurately can different forecasting methodologies predict IT security vulnerabilities?”,
for which we analyse the accuracy with regard to its robustness along the dimensions of examined
system and software packages and applied metrics. To the best of our knowledge, this study is the
first that analyses the effect of forecasting methodologies which take into account the uniqueness
and rareness of vulnerability time series and applies forecasting metrics that are suitable in this115
context.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Next, we provide an overview of related
work. In Section 3, we explain our methodology and the data set. In Section 4, we present and
discuss the results of our empirical study. The paper closes with a summary.
2. Research Background120
In this section, we give a short overview of related research by discussing and highlighting current
research streams of IT security vulnerabilities and their forecasting.
2.1. IT Security Vulnerabilities
Currently, there is no standardized definition of the term security vulnerability, and answering
the question “what is a security vulnerability?” remains a challenge (Microsoft Corporation 2015).125
We adopt the terms “vulnerability” and “exposure” of the U.S. MITRE Corporation as “security
vulnerability” for two reasons: First, the “Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures” (CVE) entries
are not only used by many empirical papers (Singh et al., 2016; Johnson et al., 2016; Younis et al.,
2016; Chatzipoulidis et al., 2015; Ozment, 2006; Ozment and Schechter, 2006; Joh, 2011; Wang
et al., 2008; Last, 2016), but also by numerous information security product and service vendors130
(Schryen, 2011, 2009) such as Adobe, Apple, IBM or Microsoft (MITRE Corporation, 2017b); and
second, the definition of vulnerabilities in the context of the CVE program covers weaknesses in
the computational logic found in software and hardware components that, when exploited, result
in a negative impact on confidentiality, integrity, or availability (MITRE Corporation, 2017c). We
therefore adopt the CVE system’s definition of an information security vulnerability being “a mistake135
in software that can be directly used by a hacker to gain access to a system or network” (MITRE
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Corporation, 2017c). Accordingly, vulnerabilities allow attackers to successfully violate security
policies by, for example, executing commands as another user, reading or changing data despite such
access being restricted, posing as another entity, or conducting a denial of service attack (MITRE
Corporation, 2017c; Telang and Wattal, 2007). A schematic classification of vulnerabilities is shown140
in the figure below.
Vulnerabilities
detected
• pre/post-release
undetected
reported
• internally/publicly
unreported
Investigated 
area in this work
Figure 1: Classification of Vulnerabilities (based on Schryen, 2011).
The status of security vulnerabilities offers a useful perspective for classifying extant research
(cf. Figure 1). Since undetected and unreported vulnerabilities cannot be observed, empirical
research generally focuses on the rightmost branch of Figure 1. In this branch of research, which is
a natural complement to the established research stream on software defect detection, most papers145
focus on techniques for detecting vulnerabilities within the software development life cycle (cf.
Walden et al., 2014). This focus on detecting pre-release security vulnerabilities naturally correlates
with internal rather than external reporting. Our work focuses on the incipient research stream
dedicated to forecasting post-release and publicly reported security vulnerabilities (e.g., Roumani
et al., 2015; Walden et al., 2014; Kim and Kim, 2016). In contrast to traditional detection techniques150
implemented in internal software project settings, this research stream generally does not assume
access to proprietary and confidential information such as software code or developer characteristics.
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2.2. IT Security Vulnerability Forecasting
The following table illustrates the IT security vulnerability forecasting literature:
Table 1: IT Security Vulnerability Prediction Models
Article Applications Predictors Technique Data Source
Regression Techniques
Shin and
Williams (2008)
JavaScript Engine
of Firefox
Code Complexity Logistic Regression Mozilla Foundation
Security Advisories,
Bugzilla
Chowdhury and
Zulkernine (2011)
Firefox Web
Browser
Complexity,
Coupling and
Cohesion
Naive Bayes, Decision
Tree, Random Forest,
Logistic Regression
Mozilla Foundation
Security Advisories,
Bugzilla
Shin et al. (2011) Firefox Web
Browser, Red Hat
Linux Kernel
Complexity,
Code Churn,
Developer
Activity
Logistic Regression Mozilla Foundation
Security Advisories,
Bugzilla, National
Vulnerability Database,
Red Hat Security
Advisory
Smith and
Williams (2011)
WordPress,
WikkaWikki
SQL Hotspots Logistic Regression WordPress,
WikkaWikki
Vulnerability Reports
Zhang et al.
(2011)
Adobe, Internet
Explorer, Linux,
Apple, Windows
Period of Time
between
Vulnerabilities
Linear Regression,
Least Mean Square,
Multi-Layer
Perceptron, RBF
Network, SMO
Regression, Gaussian
Processes
National Vulnerability
Database
Shin and
Williams (2013)
Firefox Web
Browser
Complexity,
Code Churn,
Prior Faults
Logistic Regression Mozilla Foundation
Security Advisories,
Bugzilla
Walden et al.
(2014)
PHPMyAdmin,
Moodle, Drupal
Complexity,
Source Code,
Vulnerability
Locations
Random Forest National Vulnerability
Database, Project
Announcements
Machine Learning
Neuhaus et al.
(2007)
Mozilla Project Imports and
Function Calls
SVM Mozilla Foundation
Security Advisories,
Bugzilla
Gegick et al.
(2009)
Cisco Software
System
Non-Security
Failures
Classification and
Regression Tree Models
Cisco Fault-Tracking
Database
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Nguyen and Tran
(2010)
JavaScript Engine
of Firefox
Component
Dependency
Graphs
Bayesian Network,
Naive Bayes, Neural
Networks, Random
Forest, SVM
Mozilla Foundation
Security Advisories,
Bugzilla
Scandariato et al.
(2014)
Android
Applications
Text Mining of
Java Code
Decision Trees,
k-Nearest Neighbor,
Naive Bayes, Random
Forest, SVM
Source Code of Used
Applications with
Fortify Source Code
Analyzer
Statistical Models
Ozment (2006) OpenBSD Number of
Failure Data
Reliability Growth
Models
OpenBSD Web Page,
ICAT, Bugtraq,
OSVDB, ISS X-Force
Ozment and
Schechter (2006)
OpenBSD Time between
Failures
Statistical Code
Analysis, Reliability
Growth Models
OpenBSD web page,
ICAT, Bugtraq,
OSVDB, ISS X-Force
Joh (2011) Windows XP, OS X
10.6, IE 8, Safari
Number of
Vulnerabilities
Vulnerability Discovery
Models
NVD, Secunia, OSVDB
Time Series Analysis
Last (2016) Different Browsers,
Operating Systems,
Video Players
Number of
Vulnerabilities
Regression Models,
Machine Learning
National Vulnerability
Database
Roumani et al.
(2015)
Chrome, Firefox,
IE, Safari, Opera
Number of
Vulnerabilities
ARIMA, Exponential
Smoothing
National Vulnerability
Database
The above table shows that the extant literature mainly uses regression techniques for prediction155
(Shin and Williams, 2008; Chowdhury and Zulkernine, 2011; Shin et al., 2011; Zhang et al., 2011;
Shin and Williams, 2013; Walden et al., 2014). For instance, Shin and Williams (2008) adopted code
complexity that differentiate between vulnerable functions and investigated whether code complexity
can be useful for vulnerability detection. The results indicate that complexity can predict vulnera-
bilities at a low false positive rate, but at a high false negative rate. In a similar work, Shin et al.160
(2011) examined whether complexity, code churn, and developer activity can be used to distinguish
vulnerable from neutral files, and to forecast vulnerabilities. Shin and Williams (2013) showed that
fault and vulnerability prediction models provide good accuracy in forecasting vulnerable code loca-
tions across a wide range of classification thresholds. Chowdhury and Zulkernine (2011) developed
an approach to automatically predict vulnerabilities based on historical data, complexity, coupling,165
and cohesion by using four alternative statistical and data mining techniques. The results indicate
that structural information from the non-security realm such as complexity, coupling, and cohesion
is useful in vulnerability prediction. In their study, they were able to predict approximately 75 % of
the vulnerable-prone files. Walden et al. (2014) compared the vulnerability prediction effectiveness
based on complexity, source code, and vulnerability locations in the source code for the forecast of170
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vulnerable files. They showed that text mining provides a high recall for PHPMyAdmin, Moodle,
and Drupal code analysis.
Other than approaches using mainly regression techniques, there are alternative predictors and
techniques used as well. For example, Smith and Williams (2011) analyzed whether SQL hotspots
provide a useful heuristic for the prediction of web application vulnerabilities. Their analysis reveals175
that the more SQL hotspots a file contains per line of code, the higher the probability that this file
will contain vulnerabilities. Neuhaus et al. (2007) introduced a support vector machine (SVM) based
tool that achieved high accuracy in predicting vulnerable components in software code based on
imports and function calls. Furthermore, Gegick et al. (2009) created a classification and regression
tree model to determine the probability of a component having at least one vulnerability. The180
evaluation shows that non-security failures provide useful information as input variables for security-
related prediction models. Nguyen and Tran (2010) demonstrated that dependency graphs are
another viable option to predict vulnerable components, while Scandariato et al. (2014) used the
source code of Android applications as input for text mining approaches, statistical methodologies,
and artificial intelligence techniques to determine which components of a project are likely to contain185
vulnerabilities. After validating their approach by applying it to various Android applications, they
determined that a dependable prediction model can be built.
Statistical models were also used to examine vulnerability predictions. For instance, (Ozment,
2006; Ozment and Schechter, 2006) used reliability growth models, and statistical analyses showed
that these have acceptable one-step-ahead predictive accuracy for the set of independent data points.190
Joh (2011) applied vulnerability discovery processes in major web servers and browsers: The analyses
show reasonable prediction capabilities for both time-based and effort-based models for datasets from
Web servers and browsers.
More recently, time series analysis has also been used to forecast the number of vulnerabilities.
For example, Roumani et al. (2015) considered time series models (ARIMA, exponential smoothing)195
for the prediction of security vulnerabilities. The results reveal that time series models provide a
good fit and can be helpful to predict vulnerabilities. Last (2016) analyzed the forecast of vulnera-
bilities from different browsers, operating systems, and video players using both regression models
(Linear, Quadratic, and Combined) and machine learning techniques. The evaluation of these
methodologies indicates significant predictive performance in forecasting zero-day vulnerabilities.200
However, a more detailed analysis of these approaches uncovers three issues: First, the literature
on predicting the number of IT security vulnerabilities from a time series approach is rather sparse;
second, predictions on which software components are more likely to be vulnerable do not provide
insights into the volume of vulnerabilities that will occur; and third, none of these research foci
address the uniqueness of vulnerabilities, namely, rareness of their occurrence and high volatility (as205
noted in Section 1). We therefore concentrate on predicting the number of IT security vulnerabilities
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from a time series perspective, taking into account methodologies and accuracy metrics that are
suitable for these two properties inter alia. The next section explains the different methodologies
and accuracy metrics used in this study.
3. Methodology and Data210
In this section, we motivate and outline the forecast methodologies implemented in our study
and introduce a consistent notation (Subsection 3.1), presenting accuracy metrics to compare the
different forecast approaches which are suitable in the context of security vulnerability forecasting
(Subsection 3.2). Finally, we describe the data set in terms of analyzed software systems (Subsection
3.3).215
3.1. Forecasting Methodology
In line with the study of Nikolopoulos et al. (2016), we implement a multiple forecasting approach,
in which we compare several forecasting methodologies and evaluate their performance in terms of
forecasting accuracy.
We forecast time series of monthly security vulnerabilities using the forecasting horizons of one,220
two, and three months. We then evaluate the results against a test set of held out security vul-
nerability data. Time-series forecasting approaches are organized in five main research streams:
(Exponential) Smoothing methodologies, regression methodologies, (advanced) statistical models,
neural networks, and (other) data mining algorithms (Wang et al., 2009). We refer to Chatfield
(2000), who identifies key aspects which need to be considered when choosing a forecasting method-225
ology. These include the properties of the time series being forecasted and the forecast accuracy of
the method.
In our study, we use two types of forecasting methodologies. The first group of forecasting
methodologies we use are not specifically designed for the purpose of zero-inflated time series.2
However, these methodologies are used widely in both practice and academic literature, and very230
recently for predicting the number of IT security vulnerabilities (Roumani et al., 2015). These
forecasting methodologies within this first group comprise single, double, and triple exponential
smoothing methodologies (SES, DES, and TES), which are also referred to as single exponential,
Holt’s linear trend method, and Holt-Winter’s method. In addition, we implement an ARIMA based
approach, which is an advanced statistical model.235
Regarding our context, time series of IT security vulnerabilities differ from conventional series
in the respect that they have multiple periods of zero values. Forecasting methodologies that are
2Zero-inflated time series are time series which contain a lot of zero values and show a high volatility when a value
occurs.
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appropriate for zero-inflated time series are thus especially suitable in our context (Ogcu Kaya and
Demirel, 2015). Such time series with a lot of zero values are well-known in intermittent demand
analysis: Many scholars have recognized and contributed to the problems of predicting infrequent240
and irregular demand patterns, i.e., the observed demand during many periods is zero, interspersed
by occasional periods with irregular non-zero demand (Johnston and Boylan, 1996).
We therefore use a second group of forecasting methodologies that are designed for the purpose
of handling such time series. In particular, we apply Croston’s methodology and a Neural Net-
work based approach. Croston (1972) highlighted the inadequacies of common methodologies for245
intermittent demand forecasting and developed a method, which is one of the widely used forecast-
ing methodologies for intermittent demand (Shenstone and Hyndman, 2005; Syntetos et al., 2015).
From a methodological point of view, it is built upon the estimation from the demand size and
inter-arrival rate: The original time series is decomposed into a time series without zero values and
a second one that captures durations of zero valued intervals (Herbst et al., 2014). In addition,250
we want to shed light on the following methodological association with Croston’s methodology and
SES: When data is aggregated, i.e., if in our case we had grouped the different versions together,
the zero-inflation of the data would have been decreased. In the academic literature, it is discussed
that such an aggregation could lead to time series containing no zero values for the higher aggrega-
tion levels (where the mean intermittent demand interval will be equal to unity) (Petropoulos and255
Kourentzes, 2015). In this particular case, Croston’s methodology is equivalent to SES in the case
where all periods have non-zero demands and the literature suggests using SES instead (Petropoulos
and Kourentzes, 2015). However, as we separated different versions of software and system pack-
ages, this is not the case for our data. We therefore include Croston’s methodology. Furthermore,
the suitability of Croston’s methodology for such time series has been empirically shown. It per-260
forms more effectively in forecasting zero-inflated and intermittent demand time series data (e.g.,
Kourentzes (2013); Gutierrez et al. (2008)). For example, Willemain et al. (1994) have demon-
strated that Croston’s methodology gives superior forecasts to some competing methodologies when
predicting zero-inflated time series.
Besides Croston’s methodology, we use a Neural Network-based approach that “are used to265
provide dynamic demand rate forecasts, which do not assume constant demand rate in the future
and can capture interactions between the non-zero demand and the inter-arrival rate of demand
events” (Kourentzes, 2013, p. 198). Kourentzes (2013) have shown evidence for the applicability of
neural network approaches in predicting zero-inflated time series. We therefore include both Cros-
ton’s methodology and artificial neural networks, which better address the specific characteristics270
of security vulnerability time series data.
The predicted outcome variable yˆt+h|t, used throughout the paper, is defined as the forecasted
value yˆ at time (t + h), where t is the starting time and h the proposed forecast horizon. In our
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study, we test three different forecasting horizons covering short (one month, h = 1), medium (two
months, h = 2), and long (three months, h = 3) time frames.275
3.1.1. Exponential Smoothing Methodologies
Single Exponential Smoothing
The idea behind SES is to weigh the most recent observations against the observations from the
more distant past using the parameter α. Forecasts are calculated using weighted averages where
the weights decrease exponentially as observations lie further in the past. In other words, smaller280
weights are associated with older observations. SES only depends on the linear parameter lt, which
denotes the level of the series at time t. Due to this definition, SES predicts every value into the
future with the same value, derived from the last observed level. Our outcome variable can in this
case be described as yˆt+1|t. For smaller values of α more weight is given to the observations from
the more distant past. The equation for single exponential smoothing is listed as the following:285
yˆt+h|t = yˆt+1|t = lt (1)
lt = αyt + (1− α)lt−1
Double Exponential Smoothing
Single exponential smoothing can be extended to allow forecasting of data with a linear trend,
which is called the double exponential smoothing method. This was carried out by Charles C. Holt
in 1957. This method is slightly more complicated than the original one without trend. In order to
add the trend component to the outcome variable yˆt+1|t the term bt, which denotes the slope of the
time series at time t:
yˆt+h|t = lt + hbt (2)
lt = αyt + (1− α)(lt−1 + bt−1)
bt = β(lt − lt−1) + (1− β)bt−1
While Parameter lt still denotes the level, bt represents the slope of the time series. The weight
β is used to weigh the slope between the two most recent observations against the observations from
the more distant past using the parameter α.
Triple Exponential Smoothing290
This approach is an extension of DES, with added seasonality often referred as triple exponential
smoothing (TES). There are three components in this model (cf. Equation 3). As in the previous
model, the first denotes the level while the second represents the trend component. In TES, the
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third term st denotes the seasonality component. The outcome variable yˆt+1|t can thus be defined
as follows:
yˆt+h|t = lt + hbt + st+hm−m (3)
lt = α(yt − st−m) + (1− α)(lt−1 + bt−1)
bt = β(lt − lt−1) + (1− β)bt−1
st = γ(yt − lt−1 − bt−1) + (1− γ)st−m
Where hm = [(h− 1) mod m] + 1, which ensures that the estimates of the seasonal parameters
came from the correct season.
While Parameter lt and bt are analogously defined as SES and DES, the weight γ is introduced
to weigh the seasonality component over the m most recent time periods.
3.1.2. ARIMA295
In an Auto Regressive Integrated Moving Average (ARIMA) model, the future value of a variable
is assumed to be a linear function of several past observations and random errors. ARIMA models
combine differencing with auto-regression and a moving average model. We used the ARIMA(p, d, q)
model where p is the order of the autoregressive part, d is the degree of first differencing involved,
and q is the order of the moving average part. The general equation of an ARIMA(p, d, q) model is
the following (Der Voort et al., 1996):
yˆ′t+h|t = c+ Φ1y
′
t + Φ2y
′
t−1 + . . .+ Φpy
′
t−p + θ1et−1 + θ2et−2 + . . .+ θqet−q + et (4)
where yt denotes the number of vulnerabilities at time t, yˆt+h|t is the forecast of the time series y. c is
a constant and Φp are the coefficients (to be determined by the model) of the autoregressive model.
et is a zero mean white noise error factor, and together with the coefficients, θq forms the moving
average terms. Since stationarity is a requirement for ARIMA forecasting models and security
vulnerabilities have been found to be non-stationary (Arora et al., 2006, 2010), we appropriately300
transformed the data using differentiation. With this, yˆ′t+h|t and y
′
t are the differenced series (degree
of differentiation depending on d).
3.1.3. Croston’s Methodology
In order to account for the characteristic properties of security vulnerability time series data,
we chose Croston’s methodology as an additional forecasting methodology, specifically the bias ad-
justed version of Croston’s methodology developed by Syntetos and Boylan (1999). The method
of Croston (1972) separately forecasts the non-zero periods’ magnitudes and the inter-arrival time
between successive non-zero periods using SES. yˆt+h|t is then defined as the forecasted mean of
security vulnerabilities. This method basically decomposes the intermittent vulnerabilities into two
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parts: the number of non-zero vulnerabilities zˆt+h|t and the time interval between those vulnera-
bility periods vˆt+h|t, and then applies the single exponential smoothing on both parts. Croston’s
methodology uses only one weight parameter α for both SES parts; therefore, yˆt+h|t, the estimate
of mean non-zero vulnerabilities at time t, is defined as follows:
yˆt+h|t =
zˆt+h|t
vˆt+h|t
(5)
zˆt+h|t =
zt if yt = 0αyt + (1− α)zt if yt 6= 0
vˆt+h|t =
vt if yt = 0αyt + (1− α)yˆt if yt 6= 0
Croston’s methodology is widely used in the intermittent demand forecasting. Furthermore “the
standard method to be used in the industry nowadays, being implemented in many ERP systems and305
dedicated forecasting software” (Petropoulos et al., 2016).
3.1.4. Neural Network
The last method, which makes use of neural networks (Nnet), is also particularly useful when
dealing with zero-inflated time series. It has been used extensively to predict lumpy and intermittent
demand and has shown good accuracy (Gutierrez et al., 2008; Kourentzes, 2013; Amin-Naseri and310
Tabar, 2008). We applied a feed-forward neural network with a single hidden layer. While J
denotes the number of time series observations used as input pj for the neural network, the number
of forecasted security vulnerabilities yˆt+h|t are defined as follows:
yˆt+h|t = β0 +
I∑
i=1
βig
γ0j + J∑
j=1
γijpj
 (6)
where w = (β,γ) are the weights of the network with β = [β1, ..., βI ] and γ = [γ11, ..., γIJ ] for
the output and the hidden layers respectively. The β0 and γ0j are the biases of each neuron, which315
function as the intercept in a regression for each neuron. I is the number of hidden nodes in the
network and g(·) is a non-linear transfer function, which in our case is the sigmoid logistic function
and provides the nonlinear capabilities to the model.
3.2. Accuracy Metrics
The literature on accuracy metrics can be divided into four types of forecasting error metrics3320
(Hyndman et al., 2006): Absolute metrics such as the mean absolute error (MAE) or root mean
3Note that we cannot determine true/false positive rates, since the number of vulnerabilities per month is not a
binary outcome.
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square error (RMSE), percentage-error metrics such as the mean absolute percent error (MAPE)
or mean arctangent absolute percentage error (MAAPE), relative-error metrics, which average the
ratios of the errors from a designated method to the errors of a naive method (e.g., Median Relative
Absolute Error (MdRAE)), and scale-free error metrics, which express each error as a ratio to an325
average error from a baseline method (Mean Absolute Scaled Error (MASE)).
From the above-mentioned accuracy metrics, percentage-error metrics, relative-error metrics,
and the mean absolute scaled error are not suitable for the following reasons: As we deal with zero-
inflated time series, percentage-error metrics such as the MAPE are not well-defined, i.e., MAPE has
the significant disadvantage of producing infinite or undefined values for zero or close-to-zero actual330
values (Kim and Kim, 2016). Other percentage-error metrics which were developed for zero-inflated
time series have other drawbacks. For instance, although MAAPE is being designed for the purpose
of intermittent demand forecasting (Kim and Kim, 2016), it is in itself not sufficient for interpreting
the forecasting accuracy due to its definition drawback: Regardless of the prediction, it maps every
value to the worst value of pi2 when the actual value is zero (yt = 0).335
Relative-error metrics have similar shortcomings because it would involve division by zero and
therefore is not adaptable to zero-inflated time series as well (Hyndman et al., 2006). The fourth
group of metrics, the mean absolute scaled error, is also not suitable in our context, as we applied a
rolling origin forecasting evaluation. Due to this, it is not usable in our context as the denominator
becomes indefinite. To sum up, neither of these metrics is appropriate for zero-inflated time series340
because zero observations may yield division by zero problems (Syntetos and Boylan, 2005).
Therefore and in line with other studies (e.g., Arora and Taylor (2016); Taylor and Snyder (2012);
Zhao et al. (2014)), in this study we use absolute forecast accuracy metrics due to the following
reasons: First, both the mean absolute error (MAE) and the root mean square error (RMSE) can
reflect the prediction accuracy of zero-inflated time series. Second, both accuracy metrics are widely345
used in the forecasting literature, and third, absolute error metrics are calculated as a function of
the forecast errors so that we can interpret the deviation in alignment with the structure of the
time series. In the academic literature, a combination of metrics of MAE and RMSE is suggested
to assess the model performance (Chai and Draxler, 2014). In the next subsection, we explain the
MAE and the RMSE, and in Subsection 3.2.3, we associate the accuracy metrics and time series350
structure in order to interpret the MAE and RMSE values.
3.2.1. Accuracy Metric: Mean Absolute Error
In order to capture the absolute forecasting error and to interpret our results, we assessed the
Mean Absolute Error (MAE). The MAE is one of the most commonly used metric for evaluating
the absolute error, defined as the average of the absolute errors between the measured and predicted355
values (Gospodinov et al., 2006):
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MAE =
1
N
N∑
t=1
(|yt − yˆt|) . (7)
The MAE is a scale-dependent accuracy metric and uses the same scale as the data being
measured (Hyndman et al., 2006). As our datasets contain only IT security vulnerabilities, we
can compare the absolute forecast errors between the different versions of software and system
application packages.360
A value of 0 means a perfect forecast accuracy: All predicted values are equal to the real values.
To give a sense for interpretability, we want to provide some examples for MAE as well with the
same examples we used previously for explaining MAE’s values.
Let us assume that the number of actually published security vulnerabilities during a period t
equals yt = 10. Let us further assume that the number of predicted vulnerabilities equals yˆt = 11.365
As we have only one observation, the value of MAE would get a value of 1, which is close to its
theoretical minimum of 0.
Let us now assume that the number of actually published security vulnerabilities during a period
t equals yt = 5. Let us further assume that the number of predicted vulnerabilities equals 100, i.e.,
yˆt = 100. As we have only one observation, the value of MAE would get a value of 95. However,370
regarding MAE, the value of 95 is not enough to solely explain the interpretability of MAE, which
we want to highlight with the following example: If the actually published security vulnerabilities
during a period t had been yt = 10000 and the predicted vulnerabilities equaled 10095, the MAE
would still have been 95 but on a reasonable fit as we had only an overestimation of 0.95%, while in
the first scenario we had an overestimation of 95%. These examples show that for the interpretability375
of MAE, we must associate the MAE value with the actual published security vulnerabilities as MAE
is a sum of error terms et : R≥0 → R≥0 for t ∈ N with et : (|yt − yˆt|).
3.2.2. Accuracy Metric: Root Mean Square Error
We further assessed the Root Mean Square Error (RMSE) in order to capture the absolute
forecasting error and to interpret our results. The RSME is also one of the most commonly used380
metric for evaluating the absolute error and is defined as
RMSE =
√∑N
t=1 (yt − yˆt)2
N
. (8)
The RMSE is similar to the MAE a scale-dependent accuracy metric and uses the same scale as
the data being measured (Hyndman et al., 2006). A value of 0 means a perfect forecast accuracy:
All predicted values are equal to the real values. Mathematically spoken, RMSE is a mapping of
error terms et : R≥0 → R≥0 for t ∈ N with et : (yt − yˆt)2.385
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3.2.3. Accuracy Metrics and Time Series Structure
We explained in the Subsections 3.2.1 and 3.2.2 how MAE and RMSE are defined. Comparing
both metrics, MAE is less sensitive to extreme values than RMSE (Li and Heap, 2011; Willmott,
1982; Willemain et al., 2004). When the differences between the MAE and RMSE are close to each
other, it means that very large errors are unlikely to have occurred (Li and Shi, 2010). The academic390
literature does not provide exact ranges for both the MAE and RMSE, as acceptable values depend
on the underlying context (Willmott and Matsuura, 2005). However, in general, low values close
to the theoretical minimum of zero are considered to be good (Chaplot et al., 2000). We can use
both the MAE and RMSE to give a sense of the interpretability and the relation of both accuracy
metrics regarding the predicted and the actual values. Consider the following exemplary time series395
of vulnerabilities by assuming y the actual published and yˆ the predicted vulnerabilities in the time
frame {t = 1 . . . 6}:
Table 2: Example of Actual Published and Predicted Vulnerabilities.
t t = 1 t = 2 t = 3 t = 4 t = 5 t = 6
y 0 0 1 0 5 0
yˆ 0 0 0 2 5 0
A closer look at the predicted values in this example reveals that only in t = 3 and t = 4 we
have a slight mismatch between the actual and the predicted values with one being underestimated
(y3 = 1 and yˆ3 = 0) and an overestimation in t4 with y4 = 0 and yˆ4 = 2. All in all, the forecasted400
values are good, which is reflected in the value of MAE and RMSE. The computation shows that
MAE is rather low with 0.5 and is close to its theoretical minimum. The RMSE’s value is 0.91 and
is very low as well, and is close to its theoretical minimum. In this example, the mean of the actual
published vulnerabilities is 1.0 and the mean of the predicted vulnerabilities is 1.17. Comparing
the means with the MAE and RMSE values, it shows that there is a good fit of the predicted405
vulnerabilities.
We can state that a low mean of actual published vulnerabilities over a wide time frame (e.g., 5
years) indicates that the time series contains a lot of zero values. Using MAE and RMSE ensures
that we reflect upon the prediction accuracy in a meaningful manner. A low MAE and RMSE close
to the mean of the actual vulnerabilities shows that there is a good fit of the prediction method.410
On the other hand, a high MAE and RMSE, which means that they are greater than the mean of
the actual vulnerabilities, indicates that the deviation of the predicted vulnerabilities is high and
the prediction accuracy rather poor.
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3.3. Dataset: National Vulnerability Database
We select a dataset from the National Vulnerability Database (NVD),4 which provides a com-415
prehensive list of unique vulnerability and exposure data and maps it to corresponding system
or software package (Martin, 2001). The NVD is a freely available US government data source
maintained by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). Since its launch in
1997, it has reported standardized information about almost 80,000 software vulnerabilities. Al-
though other security vulnerability databases do exist, which are often community projects, such as420
Vulners (www.vulners.com), The Exploit Database (www.exploit-db.com), or Packet Storm’s Vul-
nerability Database (www.packetstormsecurity.com), the NVD database still remains widely used
and the most exhaustive resource for security vulnerability data. The dataset has been shown to be
particularly useful for “understanding trends and patterns in software vulnerabilities, so that one can
better manage the security of computer systems that are pestered by the ubiquitous software security425
flaws” (Zhang et al., 2011).
Table 3 shows a description of the application domains5 and corresponding software and system
packages covered in our analysis. Within these application domains, we analyze a balanced mix of
closed source and open source software packages comprising the most prevalent software solutions
in terms of market share. Our dataset covers the time period from January 2002 to June 2016.430
We further distinguish the system and software packages along their major version releases, since a
package’s version can serve as a reliable predictor for its vulnerability discovery rate (Alhazmi et al.,
2005). We use the version numbers provided by the NVD database for each security vulnerability and
group them by their major releases. Since the objective of our paper is to forecast recently appearing
security vulnerabilities we focus on the root version of the software product where the vulnerability435
first appeared. Some vulnerabilities remain unpatched over multiple software versions and are
therefore listed under multiple versions in the NVD dataset. Despite the fact that this total number,
as reported on the NVD website, accurately reflects the number of vulnerabilities present in a
specific software product and version, we filter for the number of uniquely originating vulnerabilities.
Although this approach results in different sample sizes, we avoid aggregating multiple versions of a440
particular package to account for the individual vulnerability characteristics of each major version.6
Finally, the vulnerabilities were aggregated per month to generate an adequate dataset for our
analysis.
4The NVD-XML-Files are available at https://nvd.nist.gov/download.cfm.
5Note that we do not use the application domains to predict or explain vulnerabilities. Instead, the grouping
should allow for more convenient comparisons of related software products.
6An exception to this are the Firefox versions starting from version 7 and Thunderbird versions since the versioning
of these products does not reflect major changes in steps from one version to another. We labeled these as “rolling
versions”.
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Table 3: Description of the Software and System Package
Application Domain Software / System Package Release Date Open Source
Browser Mozilla Firefox 2002 Yes
Browser Google Chrome 2008 Partially
Browser Internet Explorer 1995 No
Browser Safari 2003 No
Office Microsoft Office 1990 No
Office Thunderbird 2004 Yes
OS Mac OS X 2001 No
OS Ubuntu 2004 Yes
OS Microsoft Windows 1985 No
Table 4 shows the descriptive statistics of the used software and system packages.
Table 4: Descriptive Statistics
Software / System Package Version Time Frame Vulnerabilities Monthly Average
Firefox v0 01/08/04 - 01/06/16 74 0.52
v1 01/12/04 - 01/06/16 119 0.86
v2 01/08/05 - 01/06/16 61 0.47
v3 01/12/06 - 01/06/16 117 1.026
v7 01/11/11 - 01/06/16 110 2
v8 rolling 01/12/11 - 01/06/16 196 3.63
Google Chrome v1 01/09/08 - 01/06/16 86 0.92
v2 01/05/10 - 01/06/16 458 6.27
v3 01/05/11 - 01/06/16 499 8.18
v4 01/04/15 - 01/06/16 168 12
Internet Explorer v5 01/03/99 - 01/06/16 157 0.76
v6 01/04/98 - 01/06/16 373 1.71
v7 01/12/05 - 01/06/16 31 0.25
v8 01/05/08 - 01/06/16 99 1.02
v9 01/06/11 - 01/06/16 288 4.8
v10 01/03/13 - 01/06/16 77 1.97
v11 01/12/13 - 01/06/16 152 5.07
Mac OS X v0 01/07/01 - 01/06/16 174 4.83
v2 01/12/02 - 01/06/16 36 0.22
v3 01/11/03 - 01/06/16 53 0.35
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Table 4: Descriptive Statistics
Software / System Package Version Time Frame Vulnerabilities Monthly Average
v4 01/06/05 - 01/06/16 137 0.79
v5 01/11/07 - 01/06/16 130 1.26
v6 01/03/10 - 01/06/16 22 0.29
v8 01/03/13 - 01/06/16 82 2.10
v9 01/11/13 - 01/06/16 50 1.61
v10 01/11/14 - 01/06/16 51 0.25
v11 01/09/15 - 01/06/16 140 15.56
MS Office 2001 01/12/99 - 01/06/16 16 0.08
2003 01/03/06 - 01/06/16 136 1.11
2010 01/11/10 - 01/06/16 34 0.51
Safari v1 01/06/03 - 01/06/16 20 0.13
v2 01/07/05 - 01/06/16 20 0.15
v3 01/06/07 - 01/06/16 214 1.98
v4 01/02/09 - 01/06/16 91 1.03
v6 01/06/13 - 01/06/16 27 0.75
v7 01/03/14 - 01/06/16 71 2.63
v8 01/11/14 - 01/06/16 78 4.11
v9 01/12/15 - 01/06/16 17 2.83
Thunderbird rolling 01/08/04 - 01/06/16 116 0.82
Ubuntu v11.04 01/09/08 - 01/06/16 17 0.18
v12.04 01/05/12 - 01/06/16 94 1.92
v14.04 01/05/14 - 01/06/16 54 2.16
Windows XP 01/11/01 - 01/06/16 166 0.95
Vista 01/02/07 - 01/06/16 40 0.36
7 01/06/07 - 01/06/16 105 0.97
4. Empirical Results and Discussion445
We predicted the number of IT security vulnerabilities based on the forecasting methodologies
implemented in the R package “forecast” (Hyndman, 2017).
4.1. Results
Since forecasting research has shown that long-term forecasts are generally limited in their pre-
dictive accuracy, we evaluated our methodologies on relatively short time frames forecasting one,450
20
two, and three months ahead into the future (Leitch and Ernesttanner, 1995; O¨ller and Barot, 2000).
We could not find any substantial differences in forecasting accuracy between the shorter forecasting
horizons of one or two months in comparison to the longer one of three months. Apart from the
findings of prior research and the results of our own analysis, we consider a three-month forecasting
horizon to strike a reasonable balance between having enough time to react and having accurate455
prediction accuracies for decision makers. Throughout the paper, forecasting accuracy (MAE and
RMSE) is therefore reported for the entire time frame available (cf. Table 4). Figures 2 to 18 present
the overall prediction accuracy (MAE and RMSE) for the analyzed software and system packages.
The figures are grouped according to application domains to facilitate comparisons between related
software products. We show data that is subdivided into the major versions (x-axis) for the fore-460
casting horizon of three months.7 The absolute metrics’ scores are aggregated for the whole time
frame as described in Table 4. The performance for the forecasting methodologies and the different
versions of the system and software packages is provided in Table 5, 6, and 7.
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Figure 2: Prediction Accuracy (MAE) for Browsers, h=1 (month)
7Note that the time frame of three months (h=3) means that vulnerabilities were summed up quarterly. The
prediction pertains to the next quarter.
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Figure 3: Prediction Accuracy (RMSE) for Browsers, h=1 (month)
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Figure 4: Prediction Accuracy (MAE) for Office Solutions, h=1 (month)
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Figure 5: Prediction Accuracy (MAE) for Operating Systems, h=1 (month)
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Figure 6: Prediction Accuracy (RMSE) for Operating Systems, h=1 (month)
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Figure 7: Prediction Accuracy (MAE) for Browsers, h=2 (months)
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Figure 8: Prediction Accuracy (RMSE) for Browsers, h=2 (months)
Microsoft Office Thunderbird
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Figure 9: Prediction Accuracy (MAE) for Office Solutions, h=2 (months)
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Figure 10: Prediction Accuracy (RMSE) for Office Solutions, h=2 (months)
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Figure 11: Prediction Accuracy (MAE) for Operating Systems, h=2 (months)
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Figure 12: Prediction Accuracy (RMSE) for Operating Systems, h=2 (months)
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Figure 13: Prediction Accuracy (MAE) for Browsers, h=3 (months)
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Figure 14: Prediction Accuracy (RMSE) for Browsers, h=3 (months)
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Figure 15: MAE for Office Solutions, h=3 (months)
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Figure 16: Prediction Accuracy (RMSE) for Office Solutions, h=3 (months)
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Figure 17: Prediction Accuracy (MAE) for Operating Systems, h=3 (months)
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Figure 18: Prediction Accuracy (RMSE) for Operating Systems, h=3 (months)
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Table 5: Forecasting Results (Mean Absolute Error / Root Mean Squared Error) for all Forecasting
Methodologies and Software / System Packages over a 1 Month Forecasting Horizon
Method SES DES TES Arima Croston NNet
Firefox Versions
v0 (0.92 / 1.27) (0.75 / 1.28) (0.73 / 1.23) (0.72 / 1.2) (0.63 / 1.14) (1.35 / 1.54)
v1 (1.66 / 1.7) (1.05 / 1.79) (0.96 / 1.62) (1.01 / 1.68) (0.91 / 1.65) (3.61 / 4.1)
v2 (0.72 / 1.12) (0.69 / 1.19) (0.62 / 1.04) (0.61 / 1.02) (0.56 / 1.02) (1.56 / 1.77)
v3 (0.93 / 1.27) (1.95 / 3.34) (0.7 / 1.17) (0.74 / 1.23) (0.64 / 1.16) (1.64 / 1.86)
v7 (15.81 / 5.25) (3.2 / 5.47) (2.87 / 4.83) (2.98 / 4.98) (2.39 / 4.33) (9.37 / 10.64)
v8 rolling (14.86 / 5.09) (3.43 / 5.88) (2.62 / 4.4) (2.95 / 4.92) (2.81 / 5.1) (4.91 / 5.57)
Google Chrome Versions
v1 (0.58 / 0.94) (0.75 / 1) (0.75 / 0.88) (0.82 / 0.94) (0.62 / 0.95) (1.15 / 1.78)
v2 (32.52 / 7.01) (5.63 / 7.49) (5.6 / 6.56) (6.05 / 6.91) (3.97 / 6.09) (7.3 / 11.25)
v3 (37.48 / 7.53) (5.77 / 7.67) (5.75 / 6.73) (6.56 / 7.49) (5.33 / 8.18) (8.75 / 13.5)
v4 (61.42 / 9.63) (7.01 / 9.32) (12.53 / 14.66) (7.2 / 8.22) (5.08 / 7.8) (10.24 / 15.79)
Internet Explorer Versions
v5 (0.44 / 0.79) (0.78 / 1.1) (0.54 / 0.75) (0.63 / 0.88) (0.51 / 0.75) (1.6 / 2.13)
v6 (1.59 / 2.64) (1.89 / 2.66) (1.78 / 2.5) (1.77 / 2.46) (1.99 / 2.92) (2.35 / 3.14)
v7 (0.29 / 0.65) (0.48 / 0.68) (0.45 / 0.63) (0.47 / 0.66) (0.41 / 0.61) (0.67 / 0.89)
v8 (1.13 / 1.68) (1.25 / 1.76) (1.06 / 1.49) (1.11 / 1.54) (1.12 / 1.65) (1.57 / 2.1)
v9 (2.95 / 4.07) (2.91 / 4.11) (2.35 / 3.29) (2.94 / 4.08) (2.63 / 3.86) (3.51 / 4.69)
v10 (1.14 / 3.19) (2.05 / 2.89) (1.99 / 2.79) (1.7 / 2.35) (2.29 / 3.37) (2.48 / 3.31)
v11 (3.39 / 4.84) (3.81 / 5.37) (3.33 / 4.66) (3.25 / 4.5) (2.86 / 4.21) (4.9 / 6.55)
Mac OS X Versions
v0 (0.5 / 1.65) (0.63 / 1.67) (0.75 / 1.61) (0.77 / 1.64) (0.4 / 1.54) (1.12 / 1.78)
v2 (0.25 / 0.81) (0.32 / 0.84) (0.36 / 0.77) (0.38 / 0.8) (0.2 / 0.79) (0.92 / 1.46)
v3 (0.31 / 1) (2.49 / 6.63) (0.44 / 0.94) (0.47 / 1) (0.23 / 0.88) (0.89 / 1.4)
v4 (0.4 / 1.31) (0.59 / 1.57) (0.59 / 1.28) (0.58 / 1.24) (0.28 / 1.09) (1.27 / 2.01)
v5 (0.79 / 2.6) (2.17 / 5.77) (1.07 / 2.32) (0.82 / 1.75) (0.59 / 2.32) (2.34 / 3.7)
v6 (0.65 / 2.12) (0.87 / 2.32) (0.86 / 1.85) (0.96 / 2.04) (0.46 / 1.8) (1.83 / 2.9)
v8 (1.48 / 4.84) (1.92 / 5.11) (2.02 / 4.36) (2.21 / 4.72) (1.18 / 4.58) (10.11 / 16.01)
v9 (0.54 / 1.75) (0.85 / 2.26) (0.77 / 1.66) (0.77 / 1.64) (0.41 / 1.59) (1.21 / 1.91)
v10 (5.04 / 16.5) (6.71 / 17.85) (4.01 / 8.66) (7.3 / 15.56) (3.7 / 14.4) (14.1 / 22.34)
v11 (7.63 / 24.98) (33.42 / 88.88) (9.41 / 20.32) (10.54 /
22.49)
(5.37 / 20.93) (11.66 / 18.47)
Microsoft Office Versions
v2001 (0.3 / 0.43) (0.31 / 0.44) (0.3 / 0.42) (0.3 / 0.42) (0.28 / 0.41) (0.5 / 0.67)
v2003 (1.25 / 1.78) (1.28 / 1.8) (1.24 / 1.74) (1.26 / 1.75) (1 / 1.48) (1.62 / 2.16)
v2010 (0.57 / 0.81) (0.57 / 0.81) (0.52 / 0.72) (0.59 / 0.81) (0.53 / 0.79) (0.75 / 1)
Safari Versions
v1 (0.05 / 0.4) (0.34 / 0.89) (0.18 / 0.38) (0.18 / 0.39) (0.09 / 0.35) (0.33 / 0.53)
v2 (0.11 / 0.61) (0.24 / 0.65) (0.26 / 0.57) (0.29 / 0.61) (0.17 / 0.66) (0.76 / 1.2)
v3 (21.19 / 8.33) (3.22 / 8.56) (3.51 / 7.59) (3.87 / 8.25) (1.86 / 7.24) (9.73 / 15.41)
v4 (8.6 / 5.31) (2.32 / 6.18) (2.2 / 4.74) (2.31 / 4.93) (1.23 / 4.79) (10.48 / 16.6)
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Table 5: Forecasting Results (Mean Absolute Error / Root Mean Squared Error) for all Forecasting
Methodologies and Software / System Packages over a 1 Month Forecasting Horizon
Method SES DES TES Arima Croston NNet
v6 (1.91 / 2.5) (1.01 / 2.68) (1.04 / 2.25) (1.14 / 2.43) (0.74 / 2.89) (2.68 / 4.25)
v7 (8.15 / 5.17) (2.1 / 5.58) (2.46 / 5.32) (2.31 / 4.92) (1.06 / 4.15) (4.8 / 7.61)
v8 (44.23 /
12.04)
(4.76 / 12.66) (1.22 / 2.63) (4.78 / 10.2) (2.55 / 9.93) (7.78 / 12.32)
v9 (4.91 / 4.01) (1.64 / 4.36) (1.46 / 3.16) (2.04 / 4.36) (0.87 / 3.39) (2.23 / 3.53)
Thunderbird Versions
rolling (0.82 / 1.43) (1.18 / 2.03) (0.8 / 1.34) (0.84 / 1.4) (0.78 / 1.42) (2.91 / 3.3)
Ubuntu Versions
v11.04 (0.39 / 0.67) (0.41 / 0.71) (0.37 / 0.62) (0.38 / 0.64) (0.35 / 0.63) (0.89 / 1.02)
v12.04 (1.76 / 3.08) (2.31 / 3.96) (1.66 / 2.78) (1.82 / 3.03) (1.58 / 2.87) (3.66 / 4.16)
v14.04 (1.07 / 1.86) (3.99 / 6.84) (1.37 / 2.3) (1.14 / 1.91) (1.02 / 1.84) (2.46 / 2.79)
Windows Versions
XP (1.09 / 1.54) (1.12 / 1.59) (1.04 / 1.45) (1.08 / 1.52) (0.99 / 1.45) (1.56 / 2.08)
Vista (0.44 / 0.62) (0.48 / 0.68) (0.4 / 0.56) (0.43 / 0.6) (0.39 / 0.57) (0.62 / 0.83)
Version 7 (0.85 / 1.21) (3.6 / 5.08) (0.75 / 1.05) (0.81 / 1.12) (0.76 / 1.12) (1.45 / 1.94)
Table 6: Forecasting Results (Mean Absolute Error / Root Mean Squared Error) for all Forecasting
Methodologies and Software / System Packages over a 2 Month Forecasting Horizon
Method SES DES TES Arima Croston NNet
Firefox Versions
v0 (0.95 / 1.29) (0.76 / 1.3) (0.74 / 1.25) (0.72 / 1.21) (0.64 / 1.16) (1.35 / 1.52)
v1 (1.65 / 1.7) (1.04 / 1.79) (0.96 / 1.62) (1.02 / 1.69) (0.91 / 1.66) (3.56 / 4.02)
v2 (0.72 / 1.13) (0.7 / 1.21) (0.61 / 1.04) (0.62 / 1.02) (0.57 / 1.04) (1.59 / 1.79)
v3 (0.95 / 1.29) (2.09 / 3.6) (0.69 / 1.18) (0.75 / 1.25) (0.67 / 1.22) (1.64 / 1.85)
v7 (16.79 / 5.42) (3.33 / 5.73) (2.92 / 4.94) (3.06 / 5.09) (2.5 / 4.55) (8.98 / 10.13)
v8 rolling (15.15 / 5.15) (3.54 / 6.09) (2.6 / 4.4) (2.98 / 4.95) (2.73 / 4.96) (5.51 / 6.21)
Google Chrome Versions
v1 (0.6 / 0.95) (0.77 / 1.02) (0.78 / 0.89) (0.84 / 0.95) (0.6 / 0.93) (1.32 / 1.71)
v2 (36.55 / 7.45) (6.3 / 8.29) (6.14 / 7.02) (6.48 / 7.35) (4.06 / 6.27) (9.53 / 12.34)
v3 (38.57 / 7.65) (5.93 / 7.81) (5.96 / 6.82) (6.7 / 7.61) (5.18 / 8.01) (10.55 / 13.65)
v4 (61.7 / 9.68) (6.92 / 9.12) (15.83 / 18.1) (7.41 / 8.42) (5.29 / 8.17) (10.67 / 13.81)
Internet Explorer Versions
v5 (0.44 / 0.79) (0.84 / 1.17) (0.54 / 0.75) (0.64 / 0.88) (0.51 / 0.76) (1.58 / 2.14)
v6 (1.61 / 2.68) (1.93 / 2.71) (1.83 / 2.55) (1.84 / 2.54) (2.07 / 3.06) (2.61 / 3.53)
v7 (0.30 / 0.66) (0.49 / 0.69) (0.46 / 0.64) (0.48 / 0.66) (0.41 / 0.61) (0.63 / 0.85)
v8 (1.11 / 1.66) (1.24 / 1.74) (1.05 / 1.46) (1.13 / 1.56) (1.11 / 1.65) (1.53 / 2.08)
v9 (2.97 / 4.12) (2.96 / 4.15) (2.4 / 3.34) (3 / 4.14) (2.87 / 4.26) (3.48 / 4.71)
v10 (0.97 / 2.45) (1.68 / 2.36) (1.66 / 2.31) (1.58 / 2.18) (1.68 / 2.48) (1.86 / 2.52)
v11 (3.38 / 4.96) (3.98 / 5.58) (3.38 / 4.7) (3.27 / 4.51) (3.11 / 4.62) (4.87 / 6.6)
Mac OS X Versions
v0 (0.5 / 1.65) (0.65 / 1.68) (0.79 / 1.61) (0.83 / 1.64) (0.4 / 1.57) (0.98 / 1.76)
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Table 6: Forecasting Results (Mean Absolute Error / Root Mean Squared Error) for all Forecasting
Methodologies and Software / System Packages over a 2 Month Forecasting Horizon
Method SES DES TES Arima Croston NNet
v2 (0.25 / 0.81) (0.32 / 0.84) (0.38 / 0.77) (0.4 / 0.8) (0.21 / 0.81) (0.77 / 1.39)
v3 (0.3 / 1) (2.75 / 7.14) (0.46 / 0.94) (0.51 / 1.01) (0.24 / 0.94) (0.77 / 1.38)
v4 (0.4 / 1.33) (0.64 / 1.66) (0.63 / 1.29) (0.62 / 1.24) (0.31 / 1.19) (1.05 / 1.88)
v5 (0.78 / 2.57) (2.43 / 6.29) (1.13 / 2.32) (0.89 / 1.77) (0.64 / 2.48) (1.76 / 3.16)
v6 (0.65 / 2.13) (0.91 / 2.36) (0.91 / 1.86) (1.03 / 2.05) (0.48 / 1.85) (1.44 / 2.59)
v8 (1.49 / 4.9) (2 / 5.2) (2.14 / 4.39) (2.4 / 4.77) (1.2 / 4.68) (8.47 / 15.19)
v9 (0.53 / 1.74) (0.87 / 2.27) (0.82 / 1.68) (0.84 / 1.66) (0.4 / 1.57) (1.27 / 2.28)
v10 (5.25 / 17.24) (7.38 / 19.14) (4.35 / 8.9) (8.05 / 15.97) (3.83 / 14.91) (11.63 / 20.85)
v11 (6.11 / 20.08) (35.57 / 92.3) (9.08 / 18.6) (9.99 / 19.83) (4.89 / 19.03) (12.18 / 21.85)
Microsoft Office Versions
v2001 (0.3 / 0.43) (0.31 / 0.44) (0.3 / 0.42) (0.3 / 0.42) (0.28 / 0.42) (0.53 / 0.72)
v2003 (1.27 / 1.79) (1.29 / 1.82) (1.26 / 1.75) (1.27 / 1.76) (1.08 / 1.61) (1.64 / 2.23)
v2010 (0.58 / 0.82) (0.58 / 0.81) (0.52 / 0.73) (0.59 / 0.82) (0.56 / 0.83) (0.75 / 1.01)
Safari Versions
v1 (0.05 / 0.41) (0.38 / 0.99) (0.19 / 0.39) (0.2 / 0.39) (0.1 / 0.37) (0.3 / 0.54)
v2 (0.11 / 0.61) (0.25 / 0.64) (0.28 / 0.57) (0.31 / 0.61) (0.18 / 0.69) (0.59 / 1.06)
v3 (21.31 / 8.37) (3.31 / 8.59) (3.72 / 7.62) (4.18 / 8.29) (2.05 / 7.95) (9.22 / 16.54)
v4 (8.98 / 5.43) (2.53 / 6.56) (2.33 / 4.77) (2.59 / 5.14) (1.29 / 5.01) (8.12 / 14.57)
v6 (1.94 / 2.52) (1.04 / 2.7) (1.1 / 2.26) (1.24 / 2.46) (0.8 / 3.1) (2.41 / 4.32)
v7 (8.57 / 5.3) (2.22 / 5.76) (2.55 / 5.22) (2.52 / 4.99) (1.2 / 4.68) (5.21 / 9.34)
v8 (49.8 / 12.79) (6.07 / 15.76) (1.29 / 2.65) (5.89 / 11.68) (2.89 / 11.23) (10.05 / 18.03)
v9 (4.5 / 3.85) (1.63 / 4.22) (1.58 / 3.25) (2.13 / 4.22) (0.85 / 3.31) (2.86 / 5.12)
Thunderbird Versions
rolling (0.82 / 1.43) (1.22 / 2.09) (0.79 / 1.34) (0.84 / 1.4) (0.79 / 1.43) (2.78 / 3.13)
Ubuntu Versions
v11.04 (0.39 / 0.68) (0.42 / 0.73) (0.38 / 0.64) (0.39 / 0.65) (0.38 / 0.69) (0.87 / 0.98)
v12.04 (1.77 / 3.1) (2.39 / 4.1) (1.63 / 2.76) (1.84 / 3.06) (1.6 / 2.9) (3.79 / 4.27)
v14.04 (1.17 / 2.04) (4.78 / 8.22) (1.37 / 2.33) (1.24 / 2.07) (1.07 / 1.95) (2.16 / 2.44)
Windows Versions
XP (1.1 / 1.55) (1.14 / 1.59) (1.05 / 1.46) (1.1 / 1.54) (1.03 / 1.52) (1.52 / 2.06)
Vista (0.44 / 0.62) (0.51 / 0.71) (0.4 / 0.56) (0.44 / 0.61) (0.41 / 0.6) (0.62 / 0.85)
Version 7 (0.86 / 1.22) (4.04 / 5.67) (0.76 / 1.06) (0.82 / 1.13) (0.76 / 1.13) (1.4 / 1.9)
Table 7: Forecasting Results (Mean Absolute Error / Root Mean Squared Error) for all Forecasting
Methodologies and Software / System Packages over a 3 Month Forecasting Horizon
Method SES DES TES Arima Croston NNet
Firefox Versions
v0 (0.99 / 1.32) (0.78 / 1.34) (0.76 / 1.28) (0.73 / 1.22) (0.65 / 1.18) (1.36 / 1.6)
v1 (1.67 / 1.71) (1.05 / 1.81) (0.97 / 1.63) (1.02 / 1.7) (0.91 / 1.66) (3.33 / 3.91)
v2 (0.72 / 1.12) (0.7 / 1.21) (0.62 / 1.04) (0.61 / 1.03) (0.57 / 1.04) (1.41 / 1.65)
v3 (0.95 / 1.29) (2.25 / 3.87) (0.7 / 1.18) (0.75 / 1.26) (0.69 / 1.25) (1.65 / 1.94)
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Table 7: Forecasting Results (Mean Absolute Error / Root Mean Squared Error) for all Forecasting
Methodologies and Software / System Packages over a 3 Month Forecasting Horizon
Method SES DES TES Arima Croston NNet
v7 (17.6 / 5.56) (3.55 / 6.1) (3.02 / 5.08) (3.15 / 5.27) (2.65 / 4.83) (8.46 / 9.94)
v8 rolling (15.33 / 5.19) (3.65 / 6.27) (2.64 / 4.43) (2.97 / 4.98) (2.75 / 5.01) (5.32 / 6.25)
Google Chrome Versions
v1 (0.62 / 0.97) (0.79 / 1.06) (0.77 / 0.91) (0.83 / 0.97) (0.62 / 0.96) (1.39 / 1.76)
v2 (38.37 / 7.63) (6.71 / 8.97) (6.2 / 7.3) (6.46 / 7.58) (4.14 / 6.36) (9.68 / 12.3)
v3 (40.03 / 7.79) (5.95 / 7.94) (5.86 / 6.89) (6.6 / 7.74) (5.43 / 8.34) (10.94 / 13.9)
v4 (55.13 / 9.14) (6.66 / 8.9) (20.05 / 23.58) (7.2 / 8.45) (5.15 / 7.91) (11.05 / 14.04)
Internet Explorer Versions
v5 (0.43 / 0.79) (0.89 / 1.25) (0.54 / 0.75) (0.64 / 0.88) (0.51 / 0.76) (1.98 / 2.6)
v6 (1.62 / 2.71) (1.95 / 2.74) (1.84 / 2.57) (1.86 / 2.58) (2.06 / 3.06) (2.75 / 3.6)
v7 (0.31 / 0.66) (0.49 / 0.69) (0.46 / 0.64) (0.48 / 0.67) (0.42 / 0.62) (0.69 / 0.9)
v8 (1.13 / 1.68) (1.27 / 1.78) (1.07 / 1.49) (1.15 / 1.6) (1.13 / 1.68) (1.67 / 2.19)
v9 (2.98 / 4.14) (2.97 / 4.18) (2.41 / 3.37) (3.01 / 4.18) (2.93 / 4.36) (3.68 / 4.82)
v10 (0.93 / 2.21) (1.63 / 2.29) (1.62 / 2.26) (1.6 / 2.22) (1.41 / 2.1) (1.9 / 2.49)
v11 (3.41 / 5.09) (4.21 / 5.9) (3.43 / 4.78) (3.29 / 4.56) (3.16 / 4.7) (4.76 / 6.24)
Mac OS X Versions
v0 (0.5 / 1.66) (0.66 / 1.68) (0.81 / 1.61) (0.83 / 1.65) (0.41 / 1.59) (0.92 / 1.75)
v2 (0.25 / 0.82) (0.33 / 0.85) (0.39 / 0.77) (0.4 / 0.8) (0.21 / 0.82) (0.71 / 1.36)
v3 (0.3 / 1) (2.96 / 7.59) (0.47 / 0.94) (0.51 / 1) (0.25 / 0.96) (0.72 / 1.38)
v4 (0.4 / 1.32) (0.68 / 1.75) (0.64 / 1.28) (0.62 / 1.24) (0.32 / 1.23) (1.02 / 1.95)
v5 (0.77 / 2.52) (2.68 / 6.87) (1.16 / 2.32) (0.9 / 1.79) (0.63 / 2.43) (1.55 / 2.96)
v6 (0.65 / 2.15) (0.94 / 2.4) (0.94 / 1.87) (1.04 / 2.06) (0.49 / 1.89) (1.4 / 2.67)
v8 (1.5 / 4.95) (2.06 / 5.27) (2.23 / 4.44) (2.42 / 4.81) (1.23 / 4.76) (7.74 / 14.74)
v9 (0.52 / 1.7) (0.97 / 2.5) (0.86 / 1.71) (0.83 / 1.65) (0.39 / 1.52) (1.18 / 2.24)
v10 (5.42 / 17.82) (7.91 / 20.26) (4.41 / 8.78) (8.25 / 16.4) (3.96 / 15.35) (11.39 / 21.7)
v11 (6.63 / 21.8) (35.66 / 91.34) (9.07 / 18.08) (9.73 / 19.36) (4.96 / 19.22) (12.82 / 24.43)
Microsoft Office Versions
v2001 (0.3 / 0.43) (0.32 / 0.44) (0.3 / 0.42) (0.3 / 0.42) (0.28 / 0.42) (0.55 / 0.72)
v2003 (1.28 / 1.81) (1.31 / 1.84) (1.27 / 1.77) (1.28 / 1.77) (1.13 / 1.68) (1.75 / 2.29)
v2010 (0.58 / 0.82) (0.58 / 0.81) (0.52 / 0.73) (0.59 / 0.82) (0.56 / 0.83) (0.75 / 0.98)
Safari Versions
v1 (0.05 / 0.41) (0.43 / 1.11) (0.2 / 0.39) (0.2 / 0.4) (0.1 / 0.37) (0.28 / 0.53)
v2 (0.11 / 0.61) (0.25 / 0.65) (0.29 / 0.57) (0.31 / 0.61) (0.18 / 0.71) (0.53 / 1.01)
v3 (21.47 / 8.41) (3.37 / 8.63) (3.84 / 7.66) (4.19 / 8.33) (2.1 / 8.14) (8.34 / 15.89)
v4 (9.17 / 5.49) (2.65 / 6.8) (2.41 / 4.8) (2.63 / 5.23) (1.31 / 5.08) (7.96 / 15.17)
v6 (1.98 / 2.55) (1.07 / 2.73) (1.13 / 2.25) (1.25 / 2.49) (0.84 / 3.24) (2.16 / 4.13)
v7 (8.9 / 5.41) (2.35 / 6.02) (2.63 / 5.24) (2.55 / 5.06) (1.23 / 4.77) (5.06 / 9.65)
v8 (53.76 / 13.3) (6.87 / 17.61) (1.32 / 2.64) (6.25 / 12.44) (2.99 / 11.61) (10.55 / 20.11)
v9 (5.75 / 4.35) (1.75 / 4.49) (1.72 / 3.42) (2.26 / 4.49) (0.86 / 3.33) (2.32 / 4.42)
Thunderbird Versions
rolling (0.82 / 1.44) (1.27 / 2.18) (0.81 / 1.35) (0.85 / 1.42) (0.8 / 1.46) (2.57 / 3.02)
Ubuntu Versions
33
Table 7: Forecasting Results (Mean Absolute Error / Root Mean Squared Error) for all Forecasting
Methodologies and Software / System Packages over a 3 Month Forecasting Horizon
Method SES DES TES Arima Croston NNet
v11.04 (0.39 / 0.69) (0.43 / 0.74) (0.4 / 0.66) (0.39 / 0.66) (0.4 / 0.73) (0.86 / 1.01)
v12.04 (1.79 / 3.14) (2.47 / 4.24) (1.64 / 2.76) (1.84 / 3.08) (1.63 / 2.97) (3.69 / 4.34)
v14.04 (0.97 / 1.7) (5.61 / 9.63) (1.3 / 2.18) (1.09 / 1.83) (0.88 / 1.6) (1.8 / 2.11)
Windows Versions
XP (1.1 / 1.56) (1.14 / 1.61) (1.05 / 1.47) (1.1 / 1.54) (1.05 / 1.56) (1.6 / 2.1)
Vista (0.44 / 0.63) (0.52 / 0.73) (0.4 / 0.56) (0.44 / 0.61) (0.41 / 0.61) (0.64 / 0.83)
Version 7 (0.86 / 1.22) (4.47 / 6.28) (0.76 / 1.06) (0.82 / 1.14) (0.77 / 1.14) (1.47 / 1.93)
Figures 19 - 21 plot the time series and forecasts for Internet Explorer (v6), Microsoft Office
(full), and Windows (XP) for the different forecasting methodologies. As we have a total of 270465
different software and system packages and versions, we only provide representative examples here8.
The three plots serve as exemplary cases for the three application domains displayed in Table 3,
which consist of three highly popular and widely used software products. Additionally, we selected
three version numbers that covered a sufficiently long time frame of vulnerability data.
8The other plots can be obtained from the authors.
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Figure 19: Time Series and Forecasts for Internet Explorer (v6)
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Figure 20: Time Series and Forecasts for Microsoft Office (full)
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Figure 21: Time Series and Forecasts for Windows (XP)
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4.2. Discussion470
Regarding the forecast of the expected number of IT security vulnerabilities, our work supports
organizations in improving specific aspects of IT security management, helping to protect organi-
zations against costly data breaches that could significantly harm their brand image. This is also
backed by a Ponemon Institute study which revealed that an incident caused by insecure software
costs businesses an average US$4 million (Ponemon Institute, 2017). It is also crucial to consider475
these security aspects when acquiring new software or removing software from the portfolio. For
instance, the 2016 Internet Security Threat Report by Symantec revealed that in 2015, the number
of zero-day vulnerabilities more than doubled to 54, a 125 percent increase from the year before. A
new zero-day vulnerability was found every week (on average) in 2015, and these figures are set to
increase in the future (Symantec, 2016). The results of our study help organizations to effectively480
address the economic threats of security vulnerabilities inherent in software products.
In the following, we therefore want to focus our discussion on how the accuracy of the different
forecasting methodologies is affected by the software and system packages, and how robust our
results are with regard to different error metrics. Our discussion thereby contributes to the rising
stream of literature analyzing IT security vulnerabilities from a time series perspective, and examines485
how the prediction accuracy of IT security vulnerabilities’ time series is impacted by the applied
forecasting methodology.
4.2.1. Prediction Accuracy Depending on Software and System Packages
Figures 19 - 21 display the characteristics of the time series with regards to its volatility and
rareness of occurrence. The plots further show that depending on the forecasting methodology, the490
difference between predicted and actual values varies considerably. While Croston’s methodology
produces smooth predictions with low variability, the other methodologies rapidly adapt to variations
of the time series which impacts the prediction accuracy. There is a tendency that the forecasting
methodology SES and Neural Network are less suitable (cf. Figures 2 - 18). In the case of Neural
Networks, this tendency applies to all software and system packages. The reason for the poor495
results of SES and Neural Networks lies in the properties of security vulnerability time series data,
rareness of occurrence, and a tendency towards outliers. Both characteristics have an impact on
the effectiveness of the applied forecasting methodology. In the intermittent demand literature,
this phenomenon is widely known. The infrequent demand arrivals, coupled with variable demand
sizes whenever demand occurs, render the problem of accurately estimating the demand especially500
challenging (Petropoulos and Kourentzes, 2015). Translating this to our context, this means that the
sudden appearance of vulnerabilities for a few periods results in an overestimation of vulnerabilities
in the following periods of time, i.e., vulnerabilities are predicted even if there were none. This
explains the poor performance of these two methodologies. Significantly, the result tables reveal
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that different types of forecasting methodologies lead to different performances. To interpret the505
measures, we also want to discuss the values of MAE and RMSE at this point. As MAE and RMSE
are absolute metrics, “good” and “poor” values depend on the scale of the data. For this, we refer
to Table 4, which shows the overall vulnerabilities of the entire analyzed time frame as well as a
monthly average as well. We can use the monthly average as a baseline to set this value in relation to
MAE and RMSE respectively. For most of the software and system package we observe a monthly510
vulnerability average between 1 and 4 rounded which we can use as good values for MAE. The
reason for this is that MAE takes the absolute value of forecast errors and averages them over the
entire time of the forecast time periods. Therefore, the monthly average provides a good basis to
examine the MAE values. The results in the Tables 5 - 7 show the following:
• Croston’s methodology and ARIMA show the best performance and have low MAE values (in515
terms of MAE values ranging between 1 to 4) for the vast majority of the software and system
packages.
• SES, DES and TES and Neural Network perform very volatilely and we observe very poor
MAE values for the last Safari versions up to an MAE value of 53.76.
For practice, it is important to state which method to use in order to guide a good selection of a520
forecasting methodology that performs properly. A first implication is that Croston’s method and
ARIMA can be recommended for predicting IT security vulnerabilities, as they consistently achieve
low forecasting errors. The exponential smoothing methods are more susceptible to the time series’
nature of IT security vulnerabilities time, so that their usage is not recommended at all. Regarding
Neural Network, we applied a feed-forward neural network with a single hidden layer. However, it525
turned out that this approach does not perform well in our context. In literature, there are other
neural network forecasting approaches such as a back propagation neural network with adaptive
differential evolution algorithm for time series forecasting (Wang et al., 2015), wavelet neural network
(Doucoure et al., 2016), or combinations of neural network with random walk (Adhikari and Agrawal,
2014), to name only a few that might be investigated in this context too.530
From an intra-related observation between the different software and system packages, it is
evident that for some methodologies, the prediction accuracy varies considerably. For example,
within browsers, DES together with SES and Neural Networks have achieved significantly poorer
prediction accuracies for Mac OS X (cf. Figures 5, 6, 11, 12, 17, 18), or TES with SES and Neural
Networks for some versions of Google Chrome (cf. Figures 2, 3, 7, 8, 13, 14). In general, we observe535
that the accuracy of the forecasting methodologies depends on the applied software and system
packages, and further note that approximately more or less the same prediction accuracy is close to
its theoretical minimum for both metrics, except for SES and Neural Networks (cf. Figures 2 - 18).
These observations have two implications: First, the choice of the optimal forecasting methodology
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depends on the software or system package as some methodologies are not suitable such as SES and540
Neural Networks, and second, from a managerial point of view, the tendency of low prediction errors
offers decision makers a good choice to use these forecasting methodologies in order to anticipate
the development of IT security vulnerabilities of their software and system applications in their
organization’s portfolio. A closer look at the Tables 5 - 7 reveals the following:
• Except the first version, Google Chrome is challenging to forecast: The MAE values ranges545
from 3.97 (Croston’s methodology) to 61.7 (SES).
• For Operating Systems, in general the forecasting methodologies are able to predict the amount
of vulnerabilities well. The majority of the MAE values are in good ranges within 1 and 4
(rounded).
4.2.2. Robustness of Different Measures of Prediction Accuracy550
Another issue deserving of attention is the robustness of our results in terms of the used
forecasting-error metrics MAE and RMSE. For instance, our discussion in the prior subsection re-
vealed the poor performance of SES and Neural Networks. The crucial question is how to interpret
these values and the robustness of the prediction accuracy within the two applied forecasting-error
metrics.555
We can observe that the poor performance of SES and Neural Networks is independent from
the applied metrics MAE and RMSE - both metrics show the same tendency. For most cases, in
light of our discussion in the prior subsection, we observe that the values of MAE are close to zero,
meaning that the prediction accuracy was good. The actual absolute prediction accuracy for MAE
as well as for RMSE was low in most cases (cf. Tables 5 - 7) with the exceptions of SES and560
Neural Networks for browsers. The tendency of the other methodologies shows that the forecasting
methodologies’ decomposition of the zero valued intervals is sufficient to capture the high volatility.
Important implications from this result are that that the prediction error is independent from the
applied metrics, and that the prediction accuracy was good for the forecasting methodologies despite
dealing with time series that contain many zero values. This is backed up by Table 4, in which the565
actual vulnerabilities within the time frame and the monthly averages are shown. Regarding the
latter implication, a closer look at Safari v1 reveals that within the time of 13 years, 20 vulnerabilities
occurred, implying that this time series contains a lot of zero values and, if vulnerabilities appear,
they are volatile.
Regarding the robustness of our results, we observe a same tendency for both forecasting error570
metrics, which suggests that the outcome of the accuracy of a particular forecasting methodology is
independent from the choice of the metric. Figures 2 - 18 show only slight variations between MAE
and RMSE for the different forecasting methodologies. Based on the analysis shown in the Tables
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5 - 7 and as outlined in our discussion above, we observe that our results are robust in terms of
performing the same in both MAE and RMSE.575
To conclude, we can derive the implications that (1) the metrics MAE and RMSE can measure
the actual prediction error accurately in the context of IT security vulnerabilities, and (2) the
accuracy results of the forecasting methodologies are robust in terms of the independence from the
applied metrics.
5. Conclusion580
This paper addresses the problem of forecasting the number of post-release IT security vulnera-
bilities of different system and software packages, including operating systems, browsers, and office
solutions. The analysis of vulnerabilities with time series methodologies is a rising stream in the
literature, to which our study contributes an extensive analysis of forecasting methodologies. We
apply six forecasting methodologies that are particularly appropriate for the four properties of vul-585
nerability time series: rareness of occurrence, volatility, non-stationarity, and seasonality. We review
the pros and cons of forecasting error metrics and demonstrate the appropriateness of the absolute
error forecasting metric. Using the metrics MAE and RMSE, we discussed the forecasting accuracy
based on the robustness factors software and system packages, and highlight the independence of
the accuracy results from the metrics.590
Our study reveals several important implications: First, the selection of a forecasting method-
ology depends on the software or system package as some methodologies show poor performances
(such as SES and Neural Networks). On the other hand, Croston’s method and ARIMA can be
recommended for forecasting IT security vulnerabilities as they consistently achieve low forecasting
errors. Second, our results are relevant to managerial decision makers, as they demonstrate the595
accuracy of IT security vulnerability forecasts, which can inform critical decisions on organizational
software portfolios. Third, we were able to show that absolute metrics overcome disadvantages of
others, e.g., percentage-error metrics, and that absolute metrics can cover the actual prediction error
precisely in the context of IT security vulnerabilities. Fourth, we show that the accuracy results of
the forecasting methodologies are robust in terms of the independence from using absolute metrics.600
Our study has a few limitations: Although we followed a structured and accurate search process
to identify IT security vulnerabilities from the most extensive database NVD and linked the vul-
nerabilities uniquely to the corresponding root software and system package, we may have missed
vulnerabilities, or missed those not included in the NVD database. A further limitation arises from
the limitation of the used methodologies. In our study, we used univariate time series methods,605
where the prediction of a given variable depends on a model fitted to past observations of the given
time series (Chatfield, 1988). This results in the following methodological limitations:
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1. The used (univariate) forecasting methodologies cannot include explanatory variables and the
projection of the number of vulnerabilities merely do not allow for a more detailed investigation
of the properties of the underlying vulnerability (Newbold and Granger, 1974). For example,610
releasing the software early vs. late in the development process would be an interesting angle
of analysis. That would, however, require access to proprietary/confidential data, which is not
given in our context. Variables such as characteristics of the source code, the developers, or the
internal development methods are not available in such settings and were therefore purposefully
omitted. Instead of targeting a comprehensive explanation of the root causes of vulnerabilities,615
our paper focuses on forecasting the number of post-release security vulnerabilities, treating
internals of the software producer, including proprietary and confidential information, as a
black box.
2. The concentration on magnitudes (i.e., the number of vulnerabilities) are designed to select
point predictions that minimize an expected squared error cost function (i.e., MAE and RMSE620
in our case) and these forecasting techniques often extrapolate the current trend into the
future (Kling, 1987). Existing forecasting methodologies that are designed in particular for
the prediction of turning points use signal detection from indicators and stochastic simulation
of future events (Kling, 1987). In the case of prediction of vulnerabilities, such indicators
might include developer skills, code characteristics and development methodologies and for625
the stochastic simulation, one might refer to the analysis of vulnerabilities before and after a
(major) release in future analysis.
We further want to provide an outlook on how even better forecasting and interpretability can
be achieved. To achieve better forecasting accuracy, historical data on vulnerabilities that were
found, e.g., by software engineers, and closed but not publicly announced, could be explored. This630
would increase the number of vulnerabilities and produce less zero values, in turn leading to better
forecasting results with those methodologies not designed for the purpose of dealing with zero-
inflated time series (e.g., the exponential smoothing methodologies). In this regard, the impact of
increasing public awareness, partly sparked by targeted bounty programs, on vulnerability detection
might be included in future research. It was shown that monetary incentives significantly correlate635
with the number of vulnerabilities reported, so that large companies such as Facebook, Github, and
PayPal started to collaborate with security researchers or to participate in corresponding programs
on third-party bug bounty platforms such as Wooyun, HackerOne, BugCrowd, or Cobalt (Zhao
et al., 2015). In our set of software vendors, Google and Mozilla pursue this approach and provide
cash rewards for security researchers who identify security vulnerabilities in their products. With640
the help of such programs, the number of detected vulnerabilities would increase and corresponding
data could be included in time series approaches. This, as discussed above, leads in turn to a
42
decrease in zero values and can further improve the prediction accuracy. Developer skills are a
further promising predictor of vulnerabilities. Our paper could therefore be complemented by a
broader analysis of software projects advanced by individual developers or small teams, allowing for645
a better identification of skill-related effects on the occurrence of vulnerabilities.
To conclude, we hope that our study encourages academics to develop suitable forecasting
methodologies for post-release IT security vulnerabilities, which could subsequently improve predic-
tion accuracy.
650
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